TIPS MENGELOLA KEUANGAN
Buat Perencanaan
Merencanakan pendapatan dan pengeluaran merupakan titik awal mengelola keuangan. Dengan perencanaan yang baik, kita dapat mengatur kebutuhan dan menentukan skala prioritas kebutuhan mana yang harus didahulukan untuk dipenuhi. Meskipun pada prakteknya seringkali tidak sesuai dengan perencanaan namun setidaknya dengan perencanaan kita akan lebih mudah mencapai tujuan
• Tulis pos-pos rencana Pendapatan dan Pengeluaran dalam satu bulan
• Atur pengeluaran jangan sampai lebih besar pasak daripada tiang
• Bedakan antara kebutuhan dan keinginan. Kebutuhan merupakan sesuatu yang harus dipenuhi dan diprioritaskan meski kadang tidak kita inginkan. Kebutuhan kita akan sesuatu ada batasnya. Sedangkan keinginan adalah sesuatu yang kita ‘ingin’ meskipun kadang tidak kita butuhkan. Keinginan bersifat tidak terbatas.
• Buat skala prioritas, mana kebutuhan yang sangat penting, penting, kurang penting dan tidak penting.
Catat Pengeluaran harian
Mencatat pengeluaran secara detil dapat membantu kita untuk mengetahui mana pengeluaran yang memang perlu dan merupakan kebutuhan dan pengeluaran mana yang mana yang kurang perlu dan bisa dikesampingkan di hari kemudian.
Nabung
Dalam hal ini menabung dapat digolongkan dalam 2 bagian yaitu menabung di dunia untuk berjaga-jaga atas kebutuhan yang mendesak dan menabung untuk akherat berupa harta yang kita nafkahkan di jalan Allah sebagai investasi kita untuk masa depan yang abadi. investasi akherat tidak akan pernah merugi bahkan akan berlipat ganda tak hanya di akhirat nanti tapi juga akan menambah rizki kita di dunia. Kedua tabungan ini harus kita usahakan pemenuhannya supaya ketenangan hidup kita bertambah.
Tips nabung
• Tentukan tujuan menabung - misal untuk ONH, beli motor, biaya sekolah, dsb
• Lakukan di awal bulan, jangan menunggu sisa krn biasanya manusia sulit menahan diri utk tdk menghabiskan uang (misal susah utk nabung 100 rb tapi bisa bayar utang 200 rb)
• Gunakan segala macam cara : Lembaga Keuangan, celengan ayam, toples, asuransi, obligasi dll. Untuk lembaga keuangan usahakan menggunakan jasa bank syariah atau lembaga Syariah lain misalnya BMT agar terhindar dari riba.
• Jangan meremehkan uang receh. Kata pepatah ”Berdikit-sedikit lama-lama menjadi bukit.” Bahkan dengan menabung secara rutin dan istiqomah seorang tukang becak bisa menunaikan ibadah haji.
Hindari utang
Selain itu kita juga harus berusaha menghindari utang
Tips utang
• Pikir masak-masak sebelum utang
• Sebaiknya utang hanya dilakukan jika benar-benar butuh misalnya untuk memenuhi kebutuhan primer atau untuk digunakan untuk modal usaha usaha. Jangan berhutang karena ‘keinginan’ untuk bermewah-mewahan dan membeli sesuatu yang tidak kita butuhkan atau bisa ditunda pemenuhannya
hemat dan Sederhana
Islam mengajarkan sikap pertengahan dalam segala perkara, begitu juga dalam mengeluarkan harta, yaitu tidak berlebihan dan tidak pula kikir. Sikap berlebihan adalah sikap hidup yang merusak jiwa, harta, dan masyarakat, sementara kikir adalah sikap hidup yang dapat menahan dan membekukan harta.
Ukur kemampuan diri
Jangan bergaya hidup mewah padahal kita tidak mampu. Bahkan Rasulullah selalu hidup sederhana meskipun beliau bisa hidup mewah jika beliau ingin. Tidak perlu gengsi krn barang-barang kita tidak bermerk, murahan atau sedikit kuno sepanjang masih bisa berfungsi dengan baik dan bisa menunjang kegiatan kita it’s OK.
Cari Penghasilan Sampingan
Salah satu kriteria pribadi muslim adalah Qodirun 'alal kasbi (mampu berpenghasilan) dan nafi'un li ghoirihi (bermanfaat bagi orang lain). Berusahalah untuk tetap bekerja meskipun kita berada dalam keadaan berkecukupan. Karena kita tidak pernah tahu apa yang akan terjadi di kemudian hari.
Jumat, 30 April 2010
Tips Motivasi Belajar
Motivasi Belajar
Motivasi belajar setiap orang, satu dengan yang lainnya, bisa jadi tidak sama. Biasanya, hal itu bergantung dari apa yang diinginkan orang yang bersangkutan. Misalnya, seorang anak mau belajar dan mengejar rangking pertama karena diiming-imingi akan dibelikan sepeda oleh orangtuanya.
Contoh lainnya, seorang mahasiswa mempunyai motivasi belajar yang tinggi agar lulus dengan predikat cum laude. Setelah itu, dia bertujuan untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan yang hebat dengan tujuan membahagiakan orangtuanya.
Stimulus motivasi belajar
Terdapat 2 faktor yang membuat seseorang dapat termotivasi untuk belajar, yaitu:
• Pertama, motivasi belajar berasal dari faktor internal. Motivasi ini terbentuk karena kesadaran diri atas pemahaman betapa pentingnya belajar untuk mengembangkan dirinya dan bekal untuk menjalani kehidupan.
• Kedua, motivasi belajar dari faktor eksternal, yaitu dapat berupa rangsangan dari orang lain, atau lingkungan sekitarnya yang dapat memengaruhi psikologis orang yang bersangkutan.
Tips-tips meningkatkan motivasi belajar
Motivasi belajar tidak akan terbentuk apabila orang tersebut tidak mempunyai keinginan, cita-cita, atau menyadari manfaat belajar bagi dirinya. Oleh karena itu, dibutuhkan pengkondisian tertentu, agar diri kita atau siapa pun juga yang menginginkan semangat untuk belajar dapat termotivasi.
Yuk, ikuti tips-tips berikut untuk meningkatkan motivasi belajar kita:
• Bergaullah dengan orang-orang yang senang belajar
Bergaul dengan orang-orang yang senang belajar dan berprestasi, akan membuat kita pun gemar belajar. Selain itu, coba cari orang atau komunitas yang mempunyai kebiasaan baik dalam belajar.
Bertanyalah tentang pengalaman di berbagai tempat kepada orang-orang yang pernah atau sedang melanjutkan pendidikannya ke jenjang yang lebih tinggi, orang-orang yang mendapat beasiwa belajar di luar negeri, atau orang-orang yang mendapat penghargaan atas sebuah presrasi.
Kebiasaan dan semangat mereka akan menular kepada kita. Seperti halnya analogi orang yang berteman dengan tukang pandai besi atau penjual minyak wangi. Jika kita bergaul dengan tukang pandai besi, maka kita pun turut terciprat bau bakaran besi, dan jika bergaul dengan penjual minyak wangi, kita pun akan terciprat harumnya minyak wangi.
• Belajar apapun
Pengertian belajar di sini dipahami secara luas, baik formal maupun nonformal. Kita bisa belajar tentang berbagai keterampilan seperti merakit komputer, belajar menulis, membuat film, berlajar berwirausaha, dan lain lain-lainnya.
• Belajar dari internet
Kita bisa memanfaatkan internet untuk bergabung dengan kumpulan orang-orang yang senang belajar. Salah satu milis dapat menjadi ajang kita bertukar pendapat, pikiran, dan memotivasi diri. Sebagai contoh, jika ingin termotivasi untuk belajar bahasa Inggris, kita bisa masuk ke milis Free-English-Course@yahoogroups.com.
Bergaulah dengan orang-orang yang optimis dan selalu berpikiran positif
Di dunia ini, ada orang yang selalu terlihat optimis meski masalah merudung. Kita akan tertular semangat, gairah, dan rasa optimis jika sering bersosialisasi dengan orang-orang atau berada dalam komunitas seperti itu, dan sebaliknya.
Cari motivator
Kadangkala, seseorang butuh orang lain sebagai pemacu atau mentor dalam menjalani hidup. Misalnya: teman, pacar, ataupun pasangan hidup. Anda pun bisa melakukan hal serupa dengan mencari seseorang/komunitas yang dapat membantu mengarahakan atau memotivasi Anda belajar dan meraih prestasi.
Motivasi belajar setiap orang, satu dengan yang lainnya, bisa jadi tidak sama. Biasanya, hal itu bergantung dari apa yang diinginkan orang yang bersangkutan. Misalnya, seorang anak mau belajar dan mengejar rangking pertama karena diiming-imingi akan dibelikan sepeda oleh orangtuanya.
Contoh lainnya, seorang mahasiswa mempunyai motivasi belajar yang tinggi agar lulus dengan predikat cum laude. Setelah itu, dia bertujuan untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan yang hebat dengan tujuan membahagiakan orangtuanya.
Stimulus motivasi belajar
Terdapat 2 faktor yang membuat seseorang dapat termotivasi untuk belajar, yaitu:
• Pertama, motivasi belajar berasal dari faktor internal. Motivasi ini terbentuk karena kesadaran diri atas pemahaman betapa pentingnya belajar untuk mengembangkan dirinya dan bekal untuk menjalani kehidupan.
• Kedua, motivasi belajar dari faktor eksternal, yaitu dapat berupa rangsangan dari orang lain, atau lingkungan sekitarnya yang dapat memengaruhi psikologis orang yang bersangkutan.
Tips-tips meningkatkan motivasi belajar
Motivasi belajar tidak akan terbentuk apabila orang tersebut tidak mempunyai keinginan, cita-cita, atau menyadari manfaat belajar bagi dirinya. Oleh karena itu, dibutuhkan pengkondisian tertentu, agar diri kita atau siapa pun juga yang menginginkan semangat untuk belajar dapat termotivasi.
Yuk, ikuti tips-tips berikut untuk meningkatkan motivasi belajar kita:
• Bergaullah dengan orang-orang yang senang belajar
Bergaul dengan orang-orang yang senang belajar dan berprestasi, akan membuat kita pun gemar belajar. Selain itu, coba cari orang atau komunitas yang mempunyai kebiasaan baik dalam belajar.
Bertanyalah tentang pengalaman di berbagai tempat kepada orang-orang yang pernah atau sedang melanjutkan pendidikannya ke jenjang yang lebih tinggi, orang-orang yang mendapat beasiwa belajar di luar negeri, atau orang-orang yang mendapat penghargaan atas sebuah presrasi.
Kebiasaan dan semangat mereka akan menular kepada kita. Seperti halnya analogi orang yang berteman dengan tukang pandai besi atau penjual minyak wangi. Jika kita bergaul dengan tukang pandai besi, maka kita pun turut terciprat bau bakaran besi, dan jika bergaul dengan penjual minyak wangi, kita pun akan terciprat harumnya minyak wangi.
• Belajar apapun
Pengertian belajar di sini dipahami secara luas, baik formal maupun nonformal. Kita bisa belajar tentang berbagai keterampilan seperti merakit komputer, belajar menulis, membuat film, berlajar berwirausaha, dan lain lain-lainnya.
• Belajar dari internet
Kita bisa memanfaatkan internet untuk bergabung dengan kumpulan orang-orang yang senang belajar. Salah satu milis dapat menjadi ajang kita bertukar pendapat, pikiran, dan memotivasi diri. Sebagai contoh, jika ingin termotivasi untuk belajar bahasa Inggris, kita bisa masuk ke milis Free-English-Course@yahoogroups.com.
Bergaulah dengan orang-orang yang optimis dan selalu berpikiran positif
Di dunia ini, ada orang yang selalu terlihat optimis meski masalah merudung. Kita akan tertular semangat, gairah, dan rasa optimis jika sering bersosialisasi dengan orang-orang atau berada dalam komunitas seperti itu, dan sebaliknya.
Cari motivator
Kadangkala, seseorang butuh orang lain sebagai pemacu atau mentor dalam menjalani hidup. Misalnya: teman, pacar, ataupun pasangan hidup. Anda pun bisa melakukan hal serupa dengan mencari seseorang/komunitas yang dapat membantu mengarahakan atau memotivasi Anda belajar dan meraih prestasi.
Kamis, 08 April 2010
JURNAL IFRS
Working Paper No. 12
Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World:
Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences
Holger Daske
University of Mannheim
Luzi Hail
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Christian Leuz
The Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Rodrigo Verdi
Sloan School of Management, MIT
Initiative on Global Markets
The University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business
“Providing thought leadership on financial markets, international business and public policy”
Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World:
Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences*
Holger Daske
University of Mannheim
Luzi Hail
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Christian Leuz
The Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Rodrigo Verdi
Sloan School of Management, MIT
August 2008
(Forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting Research)
Abstract
This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS reporting around the world. We analyze
the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital and Tobin’s q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that
are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the
introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms’ cost of capital and an increase in equity
valuations, but only if we account for the possibility that the effects occur prior to the official adoption date.
Partitioning our sample, we find that the capital-market benefits occur only in countries where firms have
incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong, underscoring the central importance of
firms’ reporting incentives and countries’ enforcement regimes for the quality of financial reporting.
Comparing mandatory and voluntary adopters, we find that the capital market effects are most pronounced for
firms that voluntarily switch to IFRS, both in the year when they switch and again later, when IFRS become
mandatory. While the former result is likely due to self-selection, the latter result cautions us to attribute the
capital-market effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate. Many adopting
countries have made concurrent efforts to improve enforcement and governance regimes, which likely play
into our findings. Consistent with this interpretation, the estimated liquidity improvements are smaller in
magnitude when we analyze them on a monthly basis, which is more likely to isolate IFRS reporting effects.
JEL classification: G14, G15, G30, K22, M41, M42
Key Words: Regulation, International accounting, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Market liquidity,
Cost of equity, Enforcement, Security markets
* We appreciate the helpful comments of Ray Ball, Phil Berger, Hans Christensen, John Core, Ray Donnelly, Günther
Gebhardt, Bob Holthausen, Andrew Karolyi, Steve Matsunaga, Jim Mc Keown, Martin Wallmeier, Michael Welker, and
workshop participants at the 2008 American Accounting Association meeting, American University, Bucerius Law
School, University of Chicago, Chinese University’s CIG conference, Columbia University, Darden School, UC Davis
Financial Markets Research conference, 2008 European Accounting Association meeting, Lancaster University, New
York University, University of Oregon, Queen’s University, Tilburg University, 2008 VHB Frühjahrstagung, 2008
Western Finance Association meeting, and the Wharton School. Christian Leuz gratefully acknowledges research
funding provided by the Initiative on Global Markets (IGM) at the University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business.
Holger Daske gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution of the European Commission Research Training
Network INTACCT.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024240
1
1. Introduction
The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for listed companies in
many countries around the world is one of the most significant regulatory changes in accounting
history.1 Over 100 countries have recently moved to IFRS reporting or decided to require the use of
these standards in the near future and even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is
considering allowing U.S. firms to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS
(www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-145.htm). Regulators expect that the use of IFRS enhances the
comparability of financial statements, improves corporate transparency, increases the quality of
financial reporting, and hence benefits investors (e.g., EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). From an
economic perspective, there are reasons to be skeptical about these expectations and, in particular, the
premise that simply mandating IFRS makes corporate reporting more informative or more
comparable. Thus, the economic consequences of mandating IFRS reporting are not obvious.
In this paper, we provide early evidence on the capital-market effects around the introduction of
mandatory IFRS reporting in 26 countries around the world. Using a treatment sample of over 3,100
firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS, we analyze effects in stock market liquidity, cost of equity
capital, and firm value. These market-based constructs should reflect, among other things, changes in
the quality of financial reporting and hence should also reflect improvements around the IFRS
mandate. We employ four proxies for market liquidity, i.e., the proportion of zero returns, the price
impact of trades, total trading costs, and bid-ask spreads, four methods to compute the implied cost of
equity capital, and use Tobin’s q as a proxy for firms’ equity valuations.
The primary challenge of our analysis is that the application of IFRS is mandated for all publicly
traded firms in a given country from a certain date on. This makes it difficult to find a benchmark
1 International Accounting Standards (IAS) were renamed to IFRS in 2001. We use IAS and IFRS interchangeably but
our analysis does not presume or require that earlier IAS and later IFRS adoptions have the same consequences.
2
against which to evaluate any observed capital-market effects. Our empirical strategy uses three sets
of tests to address this issue. First, using firm-year panel data from 2001 to 2005, we benchmark
liquidity, cost of capital and valuation effects around the introduction of IFRS against changes in
other countries that do not yet mandate or allow IFRS reporting. We also include firms from IFRS
adoption countries that do not yet report under IFRS at the end of our sample period because their
fiscal year ends after December 2005, which, except for Singapore, is the date from which on our
sample firms must use IFRS. Both benchmarks help us to control for contemporaneous capitalmarket
effects that are unrelated to the introduction of IFRS. In addition, we introduce firm-fixed
effects to account for unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics.
Second, still using firm-year panel data, we examine whether the estimated capital-market effects
exhibit plausible cross-sectional variation with respect to countries’ institutional frameworks. As the
regulatory change forces many firms to adopt IFRS that would not have done so otherwise, we expect
mandatory IFRS reporting to have a smaller effect or no impact in countries with weak legal and
enforcement regimes or where firms have poor reporting incentives to begin with. Moreover,
assuming that mandatory IFRS reporting is properly enforced, the impact is likely to be smaller in
countries that already have high reporting quality or where local GAAP and IFRS are fairly close
(e.g., due to a prior convergence strategy).
Third, we exploit that firms begin applying IFRS at different points in time depending on their
fiscal-year ends and that, as a result, the adoption pattern in a given country is largely exogenous
once the initial date for IFRS adoption is set.2 We relate this pattern to changes in aggregate liquidity
in a given country and month. If the introduction of IFRS reporting has indeed discernable effects,
2 We note that the initial date (and whether a country sticks to it) is likely to be endogenous to current political and
market conditions. However, once the date is set and adoption begins, the pattern is largely given, which is what our
identification strategy exploits.
3
we expect changes in aggregate liquidity to be most pronounced in months when many firms report
under IFRS for the first time. That is, changes in liquidity should mirror countries’ stepwise
transition towards the new reporting regime and not simply reflect a time trend or a one-time shock.
As this approach has fewer data restrictions, we analyze liquidity effects for 6,500 mandatory
adopters, i.e., firms that report under IFRS for the first time when it becomes mandatory.
We begin our first set of analyses with a simple difference-in-differences analysis and find that
mandatory adopters exhibit a significantly larger increase in market liquidity than a random sample
of non-adopting benchmark firms from around the world. In contrast, the changes in Tobin’s q for
mandatory adopters are insignificant and their cost of capital even increases relative to benchmark
firms. While the latter findings may be surprising, they do not yet account for the possibility that
markets likely price the IFRS mandate ahead of the actual adoption date.
Next, we run firm-level panel regressions that control for time-varying firm characteristics,
market-wide changes in the dependent variable, industry-year-fixed, and firm-fixed effects. We find
that market liquidity increases for firms that adopt IFRS reporting when it becomes mandatory. In
our main specification, the percentage of days without trades declines by 100 basis points for
mandatory adopters, which is close to a 4% liquidity improvement relative to the median level prior
to IFRS adoption. Total trading costs and the percentage bid-ask spreads both decline by 12 basis
points, indicating liquidity increases of 3% and 6%, respectively, relative to the median level prior to
IFRS adoption. The results for price impact are insignificant in the main specification. For
parsimony and to reduce measurement error, we aggregate all four liquidity proxies into a single
liquidity factor and again find a statistically significant increase in liquidity for mandatory IFRS
adopters. We also vary the composition of the benchmark sample using the complete Worldscope
population or U.S. firms only. While these variations do not change the tenor of the results, they
4
indicate that benchmarking and the specific choice of the benchmark are important in evaluating the
liquidity effects around the IFRS mandate.
The cost of capital and Tobin’s q results are mixed. Our base specification indicates an increase
in the cost of capital and a decrease of Tobin’s q in the year when IFRS reporting becomes
mandatory, similar to the difference-in-differences analysis. It is possible, though, that these results
stem from transition effects, such as temporary difficulties to forecast earnings under the new
accounting regime, which can affect the implied cost of capital, or changes in the measurement of
total assets, which can affect Tobin’s q. Another explanation is that markets anticipate the effects of
the IFRS mandate, in which case including observations of switching firms before the introduction of
IFRS (as our panel approach does) likely works against finding a decrease (increase) in the cost of
capital (Tobin’s q). Consistent with the existence of anticipation effects, we find that the cost of
capital decreases by 26 basis points and Tobin’s q increases by 7% when we measure the effect one
year before the mandatory adoption date.
While the liquidity and the (anticipation-adjusted) cost of capital and valuation effects for
mandatory adopters are economically significant, they are generally smaller than the corresponding
capital-market effects of voluntary adopters. That is, the latter group exhibits significant liquidity,
valuation and cost of capital effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting, despite the
fact that these firms have already switched to IFRS prior to the mandate.3 There are several ways to
interpret this finding. First, it could reflect comparability benefits that accrue to the voluntary
adopters when the other firms in the country have to switch to IFRS. We conduct some tests on the
3 In addition, we find significant liquidity and valuation benefits for firms that adopt IFRS ahead of the mandated
change. We label these firms “late voluntary” adopters as they switch after their home country announces the move
to mandatory IFRS reporting. One can also think of them as “early mandatory” adopters. Their adoption effects
have to be interpreted cautiously as they likely reflect self-selection, rather than IFRS reporting itself (see also Daske
et al. [2007]).
5
role of comparability effects, but are unable to provide statistical support for this argument. Second,
the capital-market effects for voluntary adopters could stem from concurrent changes in the
enforcement and governance regimes that (some) countries have introduced together with the IFRS
mandate. Such changes should affect mandatory and voluntary adopters in a given country and,
hence, could explain the capital-market effects. Our cross-sectional results, which we discuss next,
are consistent with this interpretation. Finally, as the capital-market effects are particularly
pronounced for early voluntary adopters, it is also possible that the mandate increases the
commitment associated with IFRS reporting as it eliminates dual reporting practices and the option to
reverse back to local GAAP.
Our second set of empirical tests, the cross-sectional analyses, show that the capital-market
effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting are not evenly distributed across
countries and firms. We find that the capital markets effects around mandatory IFRS adoption occur
only in countries with relatively strict enforcement regimes and in countries where the institutional
environment provides strong incentives to firms to be transparent. These findings are consistent with
the view that IFRS implementation is likely to be heterogeneous across countries (e.g., Ball [2006]),
and with the idea that firms’ reporting incentives, which are shaped by markets and countries’
institutional environments, play a crucial role for reporting outcomes (e.g., Ball, Robin, and Wu
[2003], Ball and Shivakumar [2005], Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz [2006]). We also find that the
effects for mandatory adopters are smaller in countries that have fewer differences between local
GAAP and IFRS and a pre-existing convergence strategy towards IFRS. As expected under the
reporting incentives view, these effects are largest for countries with large GAAP differences that
also have strong legal regimes. Finally, capital-market effects are stronger in member states of the
European Union (EU), possibly reflecting its concurrent efforts to improve governance and
enforcement (Hail and Leuz [2007]).
6
In our last set of analyses, we examine monthly changes in aggregate liquidity as IFRS reporting
becomes more widespread, controlling for contemporaneous changes in world market liquidity
averaged over a 100 random samples, changes in liquidity for the same calendar month in the prior
year, lagged levels in liquidity, volatility, market capitalization, and country-fixed effects. We show
that increases in IFRS reporting by mandatory adopters are associated with decreases in the
percentage of zero returns, in bid-ask spreads and, to a lesser extent, in the price impact of trades.
These findings confirm our firm-year analyses but are considerably smaller in magnitude. As the
country-month analysis is likely the cleanest test in terms of separating the consequences of the IFRS
mandate from other factors (e.g., time trends, unrelated institutional changes), the smaller magnitude
of the effects provides further evidence that the documented liquidity improvements in the firm-year
analysis cannot be attributed entirely to the IFRS mandate.4
Despite the consistency of our findings across various analyses, we caution the reader to interpret
this study carefully. First, as several countries around the world have substantially revised their
enforcement, auditing and governance regimes to support the introduction of IFRS reporting, it is
likely that our results reflect the joint effects of these efforts and hence cannot solely, or even
primarily, be attributed to the switch to IFRS. Second, our analyses are based on a relatively short
time period and it is possible that the documented effects are short-lived. But the effects could also
increase over time as market participants gain more experience with IFRS or as recent changes to
countries’ enforcement and governance regimes take further hold. Third, our valuation and cost of
capital proxies may exhibit substantial measurement error and, in particular, may be affected by the
change in accounting measurement per se, which in turn could bias the magnitude of the estimated
effects. For instance, taken at face value, our estimates of the valuation effects seem too large to be
4 An alternative explanation is lack of power. The country-month approach, which we implement in changes, is more
sensitive to the timing of the information release. Leakage of information or errors in assigning the publication of
firms’ financial reports to a particular month likely hurt this analysis more than the firm-year approach.
7
solely attributable to the IFRS mandate. Finally, while we attempt to account for anticipation and
early pricing of the IFRS mandate as well as first-time IFRS interim reporting, these effects and
transitional procedures (see IFRS 1) likely reduce the power of our tests.
With these caveats in mind, our study makes several contributions to the literature. This study is
the first to analyze the capital-market effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting for
a large and global sample of firms. The move to mandatory IFRS reporting around the world is one
of the most important policy issues in financial accounting. Hence
Pendapat tentang Jurnal IFRS
Menurut kelompok kami IFRS memberikan bukti awal pada pasar modal, IFRS wajib pelaporan di 26 negara di seluruh dunia. Menggunakan contoh pengobatan lebih dari 3.100
perusahaan yang diberi mandat untuk mengadopsi IFRS, kami menganalisis pengaruh likuiditas saham di pasar saham,biaya ekuitas, nilai modal dan perusahaan. D dalam jurnal IFRS ini menggunakan 4 proxy untuk likuiditas pasar, yaitu proporsi dari nol kembali, harga dampak dari perdagangan, total biaya perdagangan, dan tawaran bertanya menyebar. Empat metode untuk menghitung biaya tersirat dari ekuitas modal. Penerapan IFRS ini memiliki mandate untuk semua public perusahaan yang diperdagangkan di Negara diberikan dari tanggal tertentu. strategi empiris menggunakan menggunakan tiga set.
Pertama menggunakan data panel perusahaan tahun 2001-2005, patokan likuiditas, biaya modal dan efek penilaian sekitar pengenalan terhadap perubahan IFRS Negara lainnya yang belum mandat atau mengizinkan IFRS pelaporan. Kedua masih menggunakan data panel perusahaan apakah pasar modal diperkirakan dampak cross-sectional menuju variasi yang masuk akal sehubungan dengan kerangka kerja kelembagaan Negara. Sebagai kekuatan perubahan peraturan, banyak perusahaan untuk mengadopsi IFRS yang tidak akan melakukannya jika tidak, IFRS pelaporan wajib memiliki efek yang lebih kecil atau tidak berdampak di Negara-negara dengan lemah hukum dan penegakan rezim atau di mana perusahaan miskin insentif untuk melakukan pelaporan. Ketiga , bahwa perusahaan mulai menerapkan IFRS pada titik-titik berbeda dalam waktu tergantung pada akhir tahun fiscal dan sebagai akibatnya pola adopsi di Negara tertentu terutama eksogen setelah tanggal awal untuk adopsi IFRS diatur
nama kelompok :
Anggreini Wulandari (20207129)
Elsha Indah cecilia
Fitri Meida Sari
Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World:
Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences
Holger Daske
University of Mannheim
Luzi Hail
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Christian Leuz
The Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Rodrigo Verdi
Sloan School of Management, MIT
Initiative on Global Markets
The University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business
“Providing thought leadership on financial markets, international business and public policy”
Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World:
Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences*
Holger Daske
University of Mannheim
Luzi Hail
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Christian Leuz
The Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Rodrigo Verdi
Sloan School of Management, MIT
August 2008
(Forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting Research)
Abstract
This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS reporting around the world. We analyze
the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital and Tobin’s q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that
are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the
introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms’ cost of capital and an increase in equity
valuations, but only if we account for the possibility that the effects occur prior to the official adoption date.
Partitioning our sample, we find that the capital-market benefits occur only in countries where firms have
incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong, underscoring the central importance of
firms’ reporting incentives and countries’ enforcement regimes for the quality of financial reporting.
Comparing mandatory and voluntary adopters, we find that the capital market effects are most pronounced for
firms that voluntarily switch to IFRS, both in the year when they switch and again later, when IFRS become
mandatory. While the former result is likely due to self-selection, the latter result cautions us to attribute the
capital-market effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate. Many adopting
countries have made concurrent efforts to improve enforcement and governance regimes, which likely play
into our findings. Consistent with this interpretation, the estimated liquidity improvements are smaller in
magnitude when we analyze them on a monthly basis, which is more likely to isolate IFRS reporting effects.
JEL classification: G14, G15, G30, K22, M41, M42
Key Words: Regulation, International accounting, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Market liquidity,
Cost of equity, Enforcement, Security markets
* We appreciate the helpful comments of Ray Ball, Phil Berger, Hans Christensen, John Core, Ray Donnelly, Günther
Gebhardt, Bob Holthausen, Andrew Karolyi, Steve Matsunaga, Jim Mc Keown, Martin Wallmeier, Michael Welker, and
workshop participants at the 2008 American Accounting Association meeting, American University, Bucerius Law
School, University of Chicago, Chinese University’s CIG conference, Columbia University, Darden School, UC Davis
Financial Markets Research conference, 2008 European Accounting Association meeting, Lancaster University, New
York University, University of Oregon, Queen’s University, Tilburg University, 2008 VHB Frühjahrstagung, 2008
Western Finance Association meeting, and the Wharton School. Christian Leuz gratefully acknowledges research
funding provided by the Initiative on Global Markets (IGM) at the University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business.
Holger Daske gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution of the European Commission Research Training
Network INTACCT.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024240
1
1. Introduction
The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for listed companies in
many countries around the world is one of the most significant regulatory changes in accounting
history.1 Over 100 countries have recently moved to IFRS reporting or decided to require the use of
these standards in the near future and even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is
considering allowing U.S. firms to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS
(www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-145.htm). Regulators expect that the use of IFRS enhances the
comparability of financial statements, improves corporate transparency, increases the quality of
financial reporting, and hence benefits investors (e.g., EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). From an
economic perspective, there are reasons to be skeptical about these expectations and, in particular, the
premise that simply mandating IFRS makes corporate reporting more informative or more
comparable. Thus, the economic consequences of mandating IFRS reporting are not obvious.
In this paper, we provide early evidence on the capital-market effects around the introduction of
mandatory IFRS reporting in 26 countries around the world. Using a treatment sample of over 3,100
firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS, we analyze effects in stock market liquidity, cost of equity
capital, and firm value. These market-based constructs should reflect, among other things, changes in
the quality of financial reporting and hence should also reflect improvements around the IFRS
mandate. We employ four proxies for market liquidity, i.e., the proportion of zero returns, the price
impact of trades, total trading costs, and bid-ask spreads, four methods to compute the implied cost of
equity capital, and use Tobin’s q as a proxy for firms’ equity valuations.
The primary challenge of our analysis is that the application of IFRS is mandated for all publicly
traded firms in a given country from a certain date on. This makes it difficult to find a benchmark
1 International Accounting Standards (IAS) were renamed to IFRS in 2001. We use IAS and IFRS interchangeably but
our analysis does not presume or require that earlier IAS and later IFRS adoptions have the same consequences.
2
against which to evaluate any observed capital-market effects. Our empirical strategy uses three sets
of tests to address this issue. First, using firm-year panel data from 2001 to 2005, we benchmark
liquidity, cost of capital and valuation effects around the introduction of IFRS against changes in
other countries that do not yet mandate or allow IFRS reporting. We also include firms from IFRS
adoption countries that do not yet report under IFRS at the end of our sample period because their
fiscal year ends after December 2005, which, except for Singapore, is the date from which on our
sample firms must use IFRS. Both benchmarks help us to control for contemporaneous capitalmarket
effects that are unrelated to the introduction of IFRS. In addition, we introduce firm-fixed
effects to account for unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics.
Second, still using firm-year panel data, we examine whether the estimated capital-market effects
exhibit plausible cross-sectional variation with respect to countries’ institutional frameworks. As the
regulatory change forces many firms to adopt IFRS that would not have done so otherwise, we expect
mandatory IFRS reporting to have a smaller effect or no impact in countries with weak legal and
enforcement regimes or where firms have poor reporting incentives to begin with. Moreover,
assuming that mandatory IFRS reporting is properly enforced, the impact is likely to be smaller in
countries that already have high reporting quality or where local GAAP and IFRS are fairly close
(e.g., due to a prior convergence strategy).
Third, we exploit that firms begin applying IFRS at different points in time depending on their
fiscal-year ends and that, as a result, the adoption pattern in a given country is largely exogenous
once the initial date for IFRS adoption is set.2 We relate this pattern to changes in aggregate liquidity
in a given country and month. If the introduction of IFRS reporting has indeed discernable effects,
2 We note that the initial date (and whether a country sticks to it) is likely to be endogenous to current political and
market conditions. However, once the date is set and adoption begins, the pattern is largely given, which is what our
identification strategy exploits.
3
we expect changes in aggregate liquidity to be most pronounced in months when many firms report
under IFRS for the first time. That is, changes in liquidity should mirror countries’ stepwise
transition towards the new reporting regime and not simply reflect a time trend or a one-time shock.
As this approach has fewer data restrictions, we analyze liquidity effects for 6,500 mandatory
adopters, i.e., firms that report under IFRS for the first time when it becomes mandatory.
We begin our first set of analyses with a simple difference-in-differences analysis and find that
mandatory adopters exhibit a significantly larger increase in market liquidity than a random sample
of non-adopting benchmark firms from around the world. In contrast, the changes in Tobin’s q for
mandatory adopters are insignificant and their cost of capital even increases relative to benchmark
firms. While the latter findings may be surprising, they do not yet account for the possibility that
markets likely price the IFRS mandate ahead of the actual adoption date.
Next, we run firm-level panel regressions that control for time-varying firm characteristics,
market-wide changes in the dependent variable, industry-year-fixed, and firm-fixed effects. We find
that market liquidity increases for firms that adopt IFRS reporting when it becomes mandatory. In
our main specification, the percentage of days without trades declines by 100 basis points for
mandatory adopters, which is close to a 4% liquidity improvement relative to the median level prior
to IFRS adoption. Total trading costs and the percentage bid-ask spreads both decline by 12 basis
points, indicating liquidity increases of 3% and 6%, respectively, relative to the median level prior to
IFRS adoption. The results for price impact are insignificant in the main specification. For
parsimony and to reduce measurement error, we aggregate all four liquidity proxies into a single
liquidity factor and again find a statistically significant increase in liquidity for mandatory IFRS
adopters. We also vary the composition of the benchmark sample using the complete Worldscope
population or U.S. firms only. While these variations do not change the tenor of the results, they
4
indicate that benchmarking and the specific choice of the benchmark are important in evaluating the
liquidity effects around the IFRS mandate.
The cost of capital and Tobin’s q results are mixed. Our base specification indicates an increase
in the cost of capital and a decrease of Tobin’s q in the year when IFRS reporting becomes
mandatory, similar to the difference-in-differences analysis. It is possible, though, that these results
stem from transition effects, such as temporary difficulties to forecast earnings under the new
accounting regime, which can affect the implied cost of capital, or changes in the measurement of
total assets, which can affect Tobin’s q. Another explanation is that markets anticipate the effects of
the IFRS mandate, in which case including observations of switching firms before the introduction of
IFRS (as our panel approach does) likely works against finding a decrease (increase) in the cost of
capital (Tobin’s q). Consistent with the existence of anticipation effects, we find that the cost of
capital decreases by 26 basis points and Tobin’s q increases by 7% when we measure the effect one
year before the mandatory adoption date.
While the liquidity and the (anticipation-adjusted) cost of capital and valuation effects for
mandatory adopters are economically significant, they are generally smaller than the corresponding
capital-market effects of voluntary adopters. That is, the latter group exhibits significant liquidity,
valuation and cost of capital effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting, despite the
fact that these firms have already switched to IFRS prior to the mandate.3 There are several ways to
interpret this finding. First, it could reflect comparability benefits that accrue to the voluntary
adopters when the other firms in the country have to switch to IFRS. We conduct some tests on the
3 In addition, we find significant liquidity and valuation benefits for firms that adopt IFRS ahead of the mandated
change. We label these firms “late voluntary” adopters as they switch after their home country announces the move
to mandatory IFRS reporting. One can also think of them as “early mandatory” adopters. Their adoption effects
have to be interpreted cautiously as they likely reflect self-selection, rather than IFRS reporting itself (see also Daske
et al. [2007]).
5
role of comparability effects, but are unable to provide statistical support for this argument. Second,
the capital-market effects for voluntary adopters could stem from concurrent changes in the
enforcement and governance regimes that (some) countries have introduced together with the IFRS
mandate. Such changes should affect mandatory and voluntary adopters in a given country and,
hence, could explain the capital-market effects. Our cross-sectional results, which we discuss next,
are consistent with this interpretation. Finally, as the capital-market effects are particularly
pronounced for early voluntary adopters, it is also possible that the mandate increases the
commitment associated with IFRS reporting as it eliminates dual reporting practices and the option to
reverse back to local GAAP.
Our second set of empirical tests, the cross-sectional analyses, show that the capital-market
effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting are not evenly distributed across
countries and firms. We find that the capital markets effects around mandatory IFRS adoption occur
only in countries with relatively strict enforcement regimes and in countries where the institutional
environment provides strong incentives to firms to be transparent. These findings are consistent with
the view that IFRS implementation is likely to be heterogeneous across countries (e.g., Ball [2006]),
and with the idea that firms’ reporting incentives, which are shaped by markets and countries’
institutional environments, play a crucial role for reporting outcomes (e.g., Ball, Robin, and Wu
[2003], Ball and Shivakumar [2005], Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz [2006]). We also find that the
effects for mandatory adopters are smaller in countries that have fewer differences between local
GAAP and IFRS and a pre-existing convergence strategy towards IFRS. As expected under the
reporting incentives view, these effects are largest for countries with large GAAP differences that
also have strong legal regimes. Finally, capital-market effects are stronger in member states of the
European Union (EU), possibly reflecting its concurrent efforts to improve governance and
enforcement (Hail and Leuz [2007]).
6
In our last set of analyses, we examine monthly changes in aggregate liquidity as IFRS reporting
becomes more widespread, controlling for contemporaneous changes in world market liquidity
averaged over a 100 random samples, changes in liquidity for the same calendar month in the prior
year, lagged levels in liquidity, volatility, market capitalization, and country-fixed effects. We show
that increases in IFRS reporting by mandatory adopters are associated with decreases in the
percentage of zero returns, in bid-ask spreads and, to a lesser extent, in the price impact of trades.
These findings confirm our firm-year analyses but are considerably smaller in magnitude. As the
country-month analysis is likely the cleanest test in terms of separating the consequences of the IFRS
mandate from other factors (e.g., time trends, unrelated institutional changes), the smaller magnitude
of the effects provides further evidence that the documented liquidity improvements in the firm-year
analysis cannot be attributed entirely to the IFRS mandate.4
Despite the consistency of our findings across various analyses, we caution the reader to interpret
this study carefully. First, as several countries around the world have substantially revised their
enforcement, auditing and governance regimes to support the introduction of IFRS reporting, it is
likely that our results reflect the joint effects of these efforts and hence cannot solely, or even
primarily, be attributed to the switch to IFRS. Second, our analyses are based on a relatively short
time period and it is possible that the documented effects are short-lived. But the effects could also
increase over time as market participants gain more experience with IFRS or as recent changes to
countries’ enforcement and governance regimes take further hold. Third, our valuation and cost of
capital proxies may exhibit substantial measurement error and, in particular, may be affected by the
change in accounting measurement per se, which in turn could bias the magnitude of the estimated
effects. For instance, taken at face value, our estimates of the valuation effects seem too large to be
4 An alternative explanation is lack of power. The country-month approach, which we implement in changes, is more
sensitive to the timing of the information release. Leakage of information or errors in assigning the publication of
firms’ financial reports to a particular month likely hurt this analysis more than the firm-year approach.
7
solely attributable to the IFRS mandate. Finally, while we attempt to account for anticipation and
early pricing of the IFRS mandate as well as first-time IFRS interim reporting, these effects and
transitional procedures (see IFRS 1) likely reduce the power of our tests.
With these caveats in mind, our study makes several contributions to the literature. This study is
the first to analyze the capital-market effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting for
a large and global sample of firms. The move to mandatory IFRS reporting around the world is one
of the most important policy issues in financial accounting. Hence
Pendapat tentang Jurnal IFRS
Menurut kelompok kami IFRS memberikan bukti awal pada pasar modal, IFRS wajib pelaporan di 26 negara di seluruh dunia. Menggunakan contoh pengobatan lebih dari 3.100
perusahaan yang diberi mandat untuk mengadopsi IFRS, kami menganalisis pengaruh likuiditas saham di pasar saham,biaya ekuitas, nilai modal dan perusahaan. D dalam jurnal IFRS ini menggunakan 4 proxy untuk likuiditas pasar, yaitu proporsi dari nol kembali, harga dampak dari perdagangan, total biaya perdagangan, dan tawaran bertanya menyebar. Empat metode untuk menghitung biaya tersirat dari ekuitas modal. Penerapan IFRS ini memiliki mandate untuk semua public perusahaan yang diperdagangkan di Negara diberikan dari tanggal tertentu. strategi empiris menggunakan menggunakan tiga set.
Pertama menggunakan data panel perusahaan tahun 2001-2005, patokan likuiditas, biaya modal dan efek penilaian sekitar pengenalan terhadap perubahan IFRS Negara lainnya yang belum mandat atau mengizinkan IFRS pelaporan. Kedua masih menggunakan data panel perusahaan apakah pasar modal diperkirakan dampak cross-sectional menuju variasi yang masuk akal sehubungan dengan kerangka kerja kelembagaan Negara. Sebagai kekuatan perubahan peraturan, banyak perusahaan untuk mengadopsi IFRS yang tidak akan melakukannya jika tidak, IFRS pelaporan wajib memiliki efek yang lebih kecil atau tidak berdampak di Negara-negara dengan lemah hukum dan penegakan rezim atau di mana perusahaan miskin insentif untuk melakukan pelaporan. Ketiga , bahwa perusahaan mulai menerapkan IFRS pada titik-titik berbeda dalam waktu tergantung pada akhir tahun fiscal dan sebagai akibatnya pola adopsi di Negara tertentu terutama eksogen setelah tanggal awal untuk adopsi IFRS diatur
nama kelompok :
Anggreini Wulandari (20207129)
Elsha Indah cecilia
Fitri Meida Sari
JURNAL IFRS
Working Paper No. 12
Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World:
Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences
Holger Daske
University of Mannheim
Luzi Hail
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Christian Leuz
The Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Rodrigo Verdi
Sloan School of Management, MIT
Initiative on Global Markets
The University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business
“Providing thought leadership on financial markets, international business and public policy”
Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World:
Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences*
Holger Daske
University of Mannheim
Luzi Hail
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Christian Leuz
The Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Rodrigo Verdi
Sloan School of Management, MIT
August 2008
(Forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting Research)
Abstract
This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS reporting around the world. We analyze
the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital and Tobin’s q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that
are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the
introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms’ cost of capital and an increase in equity
valuations, but only if we account for the possibility that the effects occur prior to the official adoption date.
Partitioning our sample, we find that the capital-market benefits occur only in countries where firms have
incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong, underscoring the central importance of
firms’ reporting incentives and countries’ enforcement regimes for the quality of financial reporting.
Comparing mandatory and voluntary adopters, we find that the capital market effects are most pronounced for
firms that voluntarily switch to IFRS, both in the year when they switch and again later, when IFRS become
mandatory. While the former result is likely due to self-selection, the latter result cautions us to attribute the
capital-market effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate. Many adopting
countries have made concurrent efforts to improve enforcement and governance regimes, which likely play
into our findings. Consistent with this interpretation, the estimated liquidity improvements are smaller in
magnitude when we analyze them on a monthly basis, which is more likely to isolate IFRS reporting effects.
JEL classification: G14, G15, G30, K22, M41, M42
Key Words: Regulation, International accounting, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Market liquidity,
Cost of equity, Enforcement, Security markets
* We appreciate the helpful comments of Ray Ball, Phil Berger, Hans Christensen, John Core, Ray Donnelly, Günther
Gebhardt, Bob Holthausen, Andrew Karolyi, Steve Matsunaga, Jim Mc Keown, Martin Wallmeier, Michael Welker, and
workshop participants at the 2008 American Accounting Association meeting, American University, Bucerius Law
School, University of Chicago, Chinese University’s CIG conference, Columbia University, Darden School, UC Davis
Financial Markets Research conference, 2008 European Accounting Association meeting, Lancaster University, New
York University, University of Oregon, Queen’s University, Tilburg University, 2008 VHB Frühjahrstagung, 2008
Western Finance Association meeting, and the Wharton School. Christian Leuz gratefully acknowledges research
funding provided by the Initiative on Global Markets (IGM) at the University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business.
Holger Daske gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution of the European Commission Research Training
Network INTACCT.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024240
1
1. Introduction
The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for listed companies in
many countries around the world is one of the most significant regulatory changes in accounting
history.1 Over 100 countries have recently moved to IFRS reporting or decided to require the use of
these standards in the near future and even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is
considering allowing U.S. firms to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS
(www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-145.htm). Regulators expect that the use of IFRS enhances the
comparability of financial statements, improves corporate transparency, increases the quality of
financial reporting, and hence benefits investors (e.g., EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). From an
economic perspective, there are reasons to be skeptical about these expectations and, in particular, the
premise that simply mandating IFRS makes corporate reporting more informative or more
comparable. Thus, the economic consequences of mandating IFRS reporting are not obvious.
In this paper, we provide early evidence on the capital-market effects around the introduction of
mandatory IFRS reporting in 26 countries around the world. Using a treatment sample of over 3,100
firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS, we analyze effects in stock market liquidity, cost of equity
capital, and firm value. These market-based constructs should reflect, among other things, changes in
the quality of financial reporting and hence should also reflect improvements around the IFRS
mandate. We employ four proxies for market liquidity, i.e., the proportion of zero returns, the price
impact of trades, total trading costs, and bid-ask spreads, four methods to compute the implied cost of
equity capital, and use Tobin’s q as a proxy for firms’ equity valuations.
The primary challenge of our analysis is that the application of IFRS is mandated for all publicly
traded firms in a given country from a certain date on. This makes it difficult to find a benchmark
1 International Accounting Standards (IAS) were renamed to IFRS in 2001. We use IAS and IFRS interchangeably but
our analysis does not presume or require that earlier IAS and later IFRS adoptions have the same consequences.
2
against which to evaluate any observed capital-market effects. Our empirical strategy uses three sets
of tests to address this issue. First, using firm-year panel data from 2001 to 2005, we benchmark
liquidity, cost of capital and valuation effects around the introduction of IFRS against changes in
other countries that do not yet mandate or allow IFRS reporting. We also include firms from IFRS
adoption countries that do not yet report under IFRS at the end of our sample period because their
fiscal year ends after December 2005, which, except for Singapore, is the date from which on our
sample firms must use IFRS. Both benchmarks help us to control for contemporaneous capitalmarket
effects that are unrelated to the introduction of IFRS. In addition, we introduce firm-fixed
effects to account for unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics.
Second, still using firm-year panel data, we examine whether the estimated capital-market effects
exhibit plausible cross-sectional variation with respect to countries’ institutional frameworks. As the
regulatory change forces many firms to adopt IFRS that would not have done so otherwise, we expect
mandatory IFRS reporting to have a smaller effect or no impact in countries with weak legal and
enforcement regimes or where firms have poor reporting incentives to begin with. Moreover,
assuming that mandatory IFRS reporting is properly enforced, the impact is likely to be smaller in
countries that already have high reporting quality or where local GAAP and IFRS are fairly close
(e.g., due to a prior convergence strategy).
Third, we exploit that firms begin applying IFRS at different points in time depending on their
fiscal-year ends and that, as a result, the adoption pattern in a given country is largely exogenous
once the initial date for IFRS adoption is set.2 We relate this pattern to changes in aggregate liquidity
in a given country and month. If the introduction of IFRS reporting has indeed discernable effects,
2 We note that the initial date (and whether a country sticks to it) is likely to be endogenous to current political and
market conditions. However, once the date is set and adoption begins, the pattern is largely given, which is what our
identification strategy exploits.
3
we expect changes in aggregate liquidity to be most pronounced in months when many firms report
under IFRS for the first time. That is, changes in liquidity should mirror countries’ stepwise
transition towards the new reporting regime and not simply reflect a time trend or a one-time shock.
As this approach has fewer data restrictions, we analyze liquidity effects for 6,500 mandatory
adopters, i.e., firms that report under IFRS for the first time when it becomes mandatory.
We begin our first set of analyses with a simple difference-in-differences analysis and find that
mandatory adopters exhibit a significantly larger increase in market liquidity than a random sample
of non-adopting benchmark firms from around the world. In contrast, the changes in Tobin’s q for
mandatory adopters are insignificant and their cost of capital even increases relative to benchmark
firms. While the latter findings may be surprising, they do not yet account for the possibility that
markets likely price the IFRS mandate ahead of the actual adoption date.
Next, we run firm-level panel regressions that control for time-varying firm characteristics,
market-wide changes in the dependent variable, industry-year-fixed, and firm-fixed effects. We find
that market liquidity increases for firms that adopt IFRS reporting when it becomes mandatory. In
our main specification, the percentage of days without trades declines by 100 basis points for
mandatory adopters, which is close to a 4% liquidity improvement relative to the median level prior
to IFRS adoption. Total trading costs and the percentage bid-ask spreads both decline by 12 basis
points, indicating liquidity increases of 3% and 6%, respectively, relative to the median level prior to
IFRS adoption. The results for price impact are insignificant in the main specification. For
parsimony and to reduce measurement error, we aggregate all four liquidity proxies into a single
liquidity factor and again find a statistically significant increase in liquidity for mandatory IFRS
adopters. We also vary the composition of the benchmark sample using the complete Worldscope
population or U.S. firms only. While these variations do not change the tenor of the results, they
4
indicate that benchmarking and the specific choice of the benchmark are important in evaluating the
liquidity effects around the IFRS mandate.
The cost of capital and Tobin’s q results are mixed. Our base specification indicates an increase
in the cost of capital and a decrease of Tobin’s q in the year when IFRS reporting becomes
mandatory, similar to the difference-in-differences analysis. It is possible, though, that these results
stem from transition effects, such as temporary difficulties to forecast earnings under the new
accounting regime, which can affect the implied cost of capital, or changes in the measurement of
total assets, which can affect Tobin’s q. Another explanation is that markets anticipate the effects of
the IFRS mandate, in which case including observations of switching firms before the introduction of
IFRS (as our panel approach does) likely works against finding a decrease (increase) in the cost of
capital (Tobin’s q). Consistent with the existence of anticipation effects, we find that the cost of
capital decreases by 26 basis points and Tobin’s q increases by 7% when we measure the effect one
year before the mandatory adoption date.
While the liquidity and the (anticipation-adjusted) cost of capital and valuation effects for
mandatory adopters are economically significant, they are generally smaller than the corresponding
capital-market effects of voluntary adopters. That is, the latter group exhibits significant liquidity,
valuation and cost of capital effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting, despite the
fact that these firms have already switched to IFRS prior to the mandate.3 There are several ways to
interpret this finding. First, it could reflect comparability benefits that accrue to the voluntary
adopters when the other firms in the country have to switch to IFRS. We conduct some tests on the
3 In addition, we find significant liquidity and valuation benefits for firms that adopt IFRS ahead of the mandated
change. We label these firms “late voluntary” adopters as they switch after their home country announces the move
to mandatory IFRS reporting. One can also think of them as “early mandatory” adopters. Their adoption effects
have to be interpreted cautiously as they likely reflect self-selection, rather than IFRS reporting itself (see also Daske
et al. [2007]).
5
role of comparability effects, but are unable to provide statistical support for this argument. Second,
the capital-market effects for voluntary adopters could stem from concurrent changes in the
enforcement and governance regimes that (some) countries have introduced together with the IFRS
mandate. Such changes should affect mandatory and voluntary adopters in a given country and,
hence, could explain the capital-market effects. Our cross-sectional results, which we discuss next,
are consistent with this interpretation. Finally, as the capital-market effects are particularly
pronounced for early voluntary adopters, it is also possible that the mandate increases the
commitment associated with IFRS reporting as it eliminates dual reporting practices and the option to
reverse back to local GAAP.
Our second set of empirical tests, the cross-sectional analyses, show that the capital-market
effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting are not evenly distributed across
countries and firms. We find that the capital markets effects around mandatory IFRS adoption occur
only in countries with relatively strict enforcement regimes and in countries where the institutional
environment provides strong incentives to firms to be transparent. These findings are consistent with
the view that IFRS implementation is likely to be heterogeneous across countries (e.g., Ball [2006]),
and with the idea that firms’ reporting incentives, which are shaped by markets and countries’
institutional environments, play a crucial role for reporting outcomes (e.g., Ball, Robin, and Wu
[2003], Ball and Shivakumar [2005], Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz [2006]). We also find that the
effects for mandatory adopters are smaller in countries that have fewer differences between local
GAAP and IFRS and a pre-existing convergence strategy towards IFRS. As expected under the
reporting incentives view, these effects are largest for countries with large GAAP differences that
also have strong legal regimes. Finally, capital-market effects are stronger in member states of the
European Union (EU), possibly reflecting its concurrent efforts to improve governance and
enforcement (Hail and Leuz [2007]).
6
In our last set of analyses, we examine monthly changes in aggregate liquidity as IFRS reporting
becomes more widespread, controlling for contemporaneous changes in world market liquidity
averaged over a 100 random samples, changes in liquidity for the same calendar month in the prior
year, lagged levels in liquidity, volatility, market capitalization, and country-fixed effects. We show
that increases in IFRS reporting by mandatory adopters are associated with decreases in the
percentage of zero returns, in bid-ask spreads and, to a lesser extent, in the price impact of trades.
These findings confirm our firm-year analyses but are considerably smaller in magnitude. As the
country-month analysis is likely the cleanest test in terms of separating the consequences of the IFRS
mandate from other factors (e.g., time trends, unrelated institutional changes), the smaller magnitude
of the effects provides further evidence that the documented liquidity improvements in the firm-year
analysis cannot be attributed entirely to the IFRS mandate.4
Despite the consistency of our findings across various analyses, we caution the reader to interpret
this study carefully. First, as several countries around the world have substantially revised their
enforcement, auditing and governance regimes to support the introduction of IFRS reporting, it is
likely that our results reflect the joint effects of these efforts and hence cannot solely, or even
primarily, be attributed to the switch to IFRS. Second, our analyses are based on a relatively short
time period and it is possible that the documented effects are short-lived. But the effects could also
increase over time as market participants gain more experience with IFRS or as recent changes to
countries’ enforcement and governance regimes take further hold. Third, our valuation and cost of
capital proxies may exhibit substantial measurement error and, in particular, may be affected by the
change in accounting measurement per se, which in turn could bias the magnitude of the estimated
effects. For instance, taken at face value, our estimates of the valuation effects seem too large to be
4 An alternative explanation is lack of power. The country-month approach, which we implement in changes, is more
sensitive to the timing of the information release. Leakage of information or errors in assigning the publication of
firms’ financial reports to a particular month likely hurt this analysis more than the firm-year approach.
7
solely attributable to the IFRS mandate. Finally, while we attempt to account for anticipation and
early pricing of the IFRS mandate as well as first-time IFRS interim reporting, these effects and
transitional procedures (see IFRS 1) likely reduce the power of our tests.
With these caveats in mind, our study makes several contributions to the literature. This study is
the first to analyze the capital-market effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting for
a large and global sample of firms. The move to mandatory IFRS reporting around the world is one
of the most important policy issues in financial accounting. Hence
Pendapat tentang Jurnal IFRS
Menurut kelompok kami IFRS memberikan bukti awal pada pasar modal, IFRS wajib pelaporan di 26 negara di seluruh dunia. Menggunakan contoh pengobatan lebih dari 3.100
perusahaan yang diberi mandat untuk mengadopsi IFRS, kami menganalisis pengaruh likuiditas saham di pasar saham,biaya ekuitas, nilai modal dan perusahaan. D dalam jurnal IFRS ini menggunakan 4 proxy untuk likuiditas pasar, yaitu proporsi dari nol kembali, harga dampak dari perdagangan, total biaya perdagangan, dan tawaran bertanya menyebar. Empat metode untuk menghitung biaya tersirat dari ekuitas modal. Penerapan IFRS ini memiliki mandate untuk semua public perusahaan yang diperdagangkan di Negara diberikan dari tanggal tertentu. strategi empiris menggunakan menggunakan tiga set.
Pertama menggunakan data panel perusahaan tahun 2001-2005, patokan likuiditas, biaya modal dan efek penilaian sekitar pengenalan terhadap perubahan IFRS Negara lainnya yang belum mandat atau mengizinkan IFRS pelaporan. Kedua masih menggunakan data panel perusahaan apakah pasar modal diperkirakan dampak cross-sectional menuju variasi yang masuk akal sehubungan dengan kerangka kerja kelembagaan Negara. Sebagai kekuatan perubahan peraturan, banyak perusahaan untuk mengadopsi IFRS yang tidak akan melakukannya jika tidak, IFRS pelaporan wajib memiliki efek yang lebih kecil atau tidak berdampak di Negara-negara dengan lemah hukum dan penegakan rezim atau di mana perusahaan miskin insentif untuk melakukan pelaporan. Ketiga , bahwa perusahaan mulai menerapkan IFRS pada titik-titik berbeda dalam waktu tergantung pada akhir tahun fiscal dan sebagai akibatnya pola adopsi di Negara tertentu terutama eksogen setelah tanggal awal untuk adopsi IFRS diatur
Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World:
Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences
Holger Daske
University of Mannheim
Luzi Hail
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Christian Leuz
The Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Rodrigo Verdi
Sloan School of Management, MIT
Initiative on Global Markets
The University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business
“Providing thought leadership on financial markets, international business and public policy”
Mandatory IFRS Reporting Around the World:
Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences*
Holger Daske
University of Mannheim
Luzi Hail
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Christian Leuz
The Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago
Rodrigo Verdi
Sloan School of Management, MIT
August 2008
(Forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting Research)
Abstract
This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS reporting around the world. We analyze
the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital and Tobin’s q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that
are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the
introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms’ cost of capital and an increase in equity
valuations, but only if we account for the possibility that the effects occur prior to the official adoption date.
Partitioning our sample, we find that the capital-market benefits occur only in countries where firms have
incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong, underscoring the central importance of
firms’ reporting incentives and countries’ enforcement regimes for the quality of financial reporting.
Comparing mandatory and voluntary adopters, we find that the capital market effects are most pronounced for
firms that voluntarily switch to IFRS, both in the year when they switch and again later, when IFRS become
mandatory. While the former result is likely due to self-selection, the latter result cautions us to attribute the
capital-market effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate. Many adopting
countries have made concurrent efforts to improve enforcement and governance regimes, which likely play
into our findings. Consistent with this interpretation, the estimated liquidity improvements are smaller in
magnitude when we analyze them on a monthly basis, which is more likely to isolate IFRS reporting effects.
JEL classification: G14, G15, G30, K22, M41, M42
Key Words: Regulation, International accounting, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Market liquidity,
Cost of equity, Enforcement, Security markets
* We appreciate the helpful comments of Ray Ball, Phil Berger, Hans Christensen, John Core, Ray Donnelly, Günther
Gebhardt, Bob Holthausen, Andrew Karolyi, Steve Matsunaga, Jim Mc Keown, Martin Wallmeier, Michael Welker, and
workshop participants at the 2008 American Accounting Association meeting, American University, Bucerius Law
School, University of Chicago, Chinese University’s CIG conference, Columbia University, Darden School, UC Davis
Financial Markets Research conference, 2008 European Accounting Association meeting, Lancaster University, New
York University, University of Oregon, Queen’s University, Tilburg University, 2008 VHB Frühjahrstagung, 2008
Western Finance Association meeting, and the Wharton School. Christian Leuz gratefully acknowledges research
funding provided by the Initiative on Global Markets (IGM) at the University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business.
Holger Daske gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution of the European Commission Research Training
Network INTACCT.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024240
1
1. Introduction
The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for listed companies in
many countries around the world is one of the most significant regulatory changes in accounting
history.1 Over 100 countries have recently moved to IFRS reporting or decided to require the use of
these standards in the near future and even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is
considering allowing U.S. firms to prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS
(www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-145.htm). Regulators expect that the use of IFRS enhances the
comparability of financial statements, improves corporate transparency, increases the quality of
financial reporting, and hence benefits investors (e.g., EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). From an
economic perspective, there are reasons to be skeptical about these expectations and, in particular, the
premise that simply mandating IFRS makes corporate reporting more informative or more
comparable. Thus, the economic consequences of mandating IFRS reporting are not obvious.
In this paper, we provide early evidence on the capital-market effects around the introduction of
mandatory IFRS reporting in 26 countries around the world. Using a treatment sample of over 3,100
firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS, we analyze effects in stock market liquidity, cost of equity
capital, and firm value. These market-based constructs should reflect, among other things, changes in
the quality of financial reporting and hence should also reflect improvements around the IFRS
mandate. We employ four proxies for market liquidity, i.e., the proportion of zero returns, the price
impact of trades, total trading costs, and bid-ask spreads, four methods to compute the implied cost of
equity capital, and use Tobin’s q as a proxy for firms’ equity valuations.
The primary challenge of our analysis is that the application of IFRS is mandated for all publicly
traded firms in a given country from a certain date on. This makes it difficult to find a benchmark
1 International Accounting Standards (IAS) were renamed to IFRS in 2001. We use IAS and IFRS interchangeably but
our analysis does not presume or require that earlier IAS and later IFRS adoptions have the same consequences.
2
against which to evaluate any observed capital-market effects. Our empirical strategy uses three sets
of tests to address this issue. First, using firm-year panel data from 2001 to 2005, we benchmark
liquidity, cost of capital and valuation effects around the introduction of IFRS against changes in
other countries that do not yet mandate or allow IFRS reporting. We also include firms from IFRS
adoption countries that do not yet report under IFRS at the end of our sample period because their
fiscal year ends after December 2005, which, except for Singapore, is the date from which on our
sample firms must use IFRS. Both benchmarks help us to control for contemporaneous capitalmarket
effects that are unrelated to the introduction of IFRS. In addition, we introduce firm-fixed
effects to account for unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics.
Second, still using firm-year panel data, we examine whether the estimated capital-market effects
exhibit plausible cross-sectional variation with respect to countries’ institutional frameworks. As the
regulatory change forces many firms to adopt IFRS that would not have done so otherwise, we expect
mandatory IFRS reporting to have a smaller effect or no impact in countries with weak legal and
enforcement regimes or where firms have poor reporting incentives to begin with. Moreover,
assuming that mandatory IFRS reporting is properly enforced, the impact is likely to be smaller in
countries that already have high reporting quality or where local GAAP and IFRS are fairly close
(e.g., due to a prior convergence strategy).
Third, we exploit that firms begin applying IFRS at different points in time depending on their
fiscal-year ends and that, as a result, the adoption pattern in a given country is largely exogenous
once the initial date for IFRS adoption is set.2 We relate this pattern to changes in aggregate liquidity
in a given country and month. If the introduction of IFRS reporting has indeed discernable effects,
2 We note that the initial date (and whether a country sticks to it) is likely to be endogenous to current political and
market conditions. However, once the date is set and adoption begins, the pattern is largely given, which is what our
identification strategy exploits.
3
we expect changes in aggregate liquidity to be most pronounced in months when many firms report
under IFRS for the first time. That is, changes in liquidity should mirror countries’ stepwise
transition towards the new reporting regime and not simply reflect a time trend or a one-time shock.
As this approach has fewer data restrictions, we analyze liquidity effects for 6,500 mandatory
adopters, i.e., firms that report under IFRS for the first time when it becomes mandatory.
We begin our first set of analyses with a simple difference-in-differences analysis and find that
mandatory adopters exhibit a significantly larger increase in market liquidity than a random sample
of non-adopting benchmark firms from around the world. In contrast, the changes in Tobin’s q for
mandatory adopters are insignificant and their cost of capital even increases relative to benchmark
firms. While the latter findings may be surprising, they do not yet account for the possibility that
markets likely price the IFRS mandate ahead of the actual adoption date.
Next, we run firm-level panel regressions that control for time-varying firm characteristics,
market-wide changes in the dependent variable, industry-year-fixed, and firm-fixed effects. We find
that market liquidity increases for firms that adopt IFRS reporting when it becomes mandatory. In
our main specification, the percentage of days without trades declines by 100 basis points for
mandatory adopters, which is close to a 4% liquidity improvement relative to the median level prior
to IFRS adoption. Total trading costs and the percentage bid-ask spreads both decline by 12 basis
points, indicating liquidity increases of 3% and 6%, respectively, relative to the median level prior to
IFRS adoption. The results for price impact are insignificant in the main specification. For
parsimony and to reduce measurement error, we aggregate all four liquidity proxies into a single
liquidity factor and again find a statistically significant increase in liquidity for mandatory IFRS
adopters. We also vary the composition of the benchmark sample using the complete Worldscope
population or U.S. firms only. While these variations do not change the tenor of the results, they
4
indicate that benchmarking and the specific choice of the benchmark are important in evaluating the
liquidity effects around the IFRS mandate.
The cost of capital and Tobin’s q results are mixed. Our base specification indicates an increase
in the cost of capital and a decrease of Tobin’s q in the year when IFRS reporting becomes
mandatory, similar to the difference-in-differences analysis. It is possible, though, that these results
stem from transition effects, such as temporary difficulties to forecast earnings under the new
accounting regime, which can affect the implied cost of capital, or changes in the measurement of
total assets, which can affect Tobin’s q. Another explanation is that markets anticipate the effects of
the IFRS mandate, in which case including observations of switching firms before the introduction of
IFRS (as our panel approach does) likely works against finding a decrease (increase) in the cost of
capital (Tobin’s q). Consistent with the existence of anticipation effects, we find that the cost of
capital decreases by 26 basis points and Tobin’s q increases by 7% when we measure the effect one
year before the mandatory adoption date.
While the liquidity and the (anticipation-adjusted) cost of capital and valuation effects for
mandatory adopters are economically significant, they are generally smaller than the corresponding
capital-market effects of voluntary adopters. That is, the latter group exhibits significant liquidity,
valuation and cost of capital effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting, despite the
fact that these firms have already switched to IFRS prior to the mandate.3 There are several ways to
interpret this finding. First, it could reflect comparability benefits that accrue to the voluntary
adopters when the other firms in the country have to switch to IFRS. We conduct some tests on the
3 In addition, we find significant liquidity and valuation benefits for firms that adopt IFRS ahead of the mandated
change. We label these firms “late voluntary” adopters as they switch after their home country announces the move
to mandatory IFRS reporting. One can also think of them as “early mandatory” adopters. Their adoption effects
have to be interpreted cautiously as they likely reflect self-selection, rather than IFRS reporting itself (see also Daske
et al. [2007]).
5
role of comparability effects, but are unable to provide statistical support for this argument. Second,
the capital-market effects for voluntary adopters could stem from concurrent changes in the
enforcement and governance regimes that (some) countries have introduced together with the IFRS
mandate. Such changes should affect mandatory and voluntary adopters in a given country and,
hence, could explain the capital-market effects. Our cross-sectional results, which we discuss next,
are consistent with this interpretation. Finally, as the capital-market effects are particularly
pronounced for early voluntary adopters, it is also possible that the mandate increases the
commitment associated with IFRS reporting as it eliminates dual reporting practices and the option to
reverse back to local GAAP.
Our second set of empirical tests, the cross-sectional analyses, show that the capital-market
effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting are not evenly distributed across
countries and firms. We find that the capital markets effects around mandatory IFRS adoption occur
only in countries with relatively strict enforcement regimes and in countries where the institutional
environment provides strong incentives to firms to be transparent. These findings are consistent with
the view that IFRS implementation is likely to be heterogeneous across countries (e.g., Ball [2006]),
and with the idea that firms’ reporting incentives, which are shaped by markets and countries’
institutional environments, play a crucial role for reporting outcomes (e.g., Ball, Robin, and Wu
[2003], Ball and Shivakumar [2005], Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz [2006]). We also find that the
effects for mandatory adopters are smaller in countries that have fewer differences between local
GAAP and IFRS and a pre-existing convergence strategy towards IFRS. As expected under the
reporting incentives view, these effects are largest for countries with large GAAP differences that
also have strong legal regimes. Finally, capital-market effects are stronger in member states of the
European Union (EU), possibly reflecting its concurrent efforts to improve governance and
enforcement (Hail and Leuz [2007]).
6
In our last set of analyses, we examine monthly changes in aggregate liquidity as IFRS reporting
becomes more widespread, controlling for contemporaneous changes in world market liquidity
averaged over a 100 random samples, changes in liquidity for the same calendar month in the prior
year, lagged levels in liquidity, volatility, market capitalization, and country-fixed effects. We show
that increases in IFRS reporting by mandatory adopters are associated with decreases in the
percentage of zero returns, in bid-ask spreads and, to a lesser extent, in the price impact of trades.
These findings confirm our firm-year analyses but are considerably smaller in magnitude. As the
country-month analysis is likely the cleanest test in terms of separating the consequences of the IFRS
mandate from other factors (e.g., time trends, unrelated institutional changes), the smaller magnitude
of the effects provides further evidence that the documented liquidity improvements in the firm-year
analysis cannot be attributed entirely to the IFRS mandate.4
Despite the consistency of our findings across various analyses, we caution the reader to interpret
this study carefully. First, as several countries around the world have substantially revised their
enforcement, auditing and governance regimes to support the introduction of IFRS reporting, it is
likely that our results reflect the joint effects of these efforts and hence cannot solely, or even
primarily, be attributed to the switch to IFRS. Second, our analyses are based on a relatively short
time period and it is possible that the documented effects are short-lived. But the effects could also
increase over time as market participants gain more experience with IFRS or as recent changes to
countries’ enforcement and governance regimes take further hold. Third, our valuation and cost of
capital proxies may exhibit substantial measurement error and, in particular, may be affected by the
change in accounting measurement per se, which in turn could bias the magnitude of the estimated
effects. For instance, taken at face value, our estimates of the valuation effects seem too large to be
4 An alternative explanation is lack of power. The country-month approach, which we implement in changes, is more
sensitive to the timing of the information release. Leakage of information or errors in assigning the publication of
firms’ financial reports to a particular month likely hurt this analysis more than the firm-year approach.
7
solely attributable to the IFRS mandate. Finally, while we attempt to account for anticipation and
early pricing of the IFRS mandate as well as first-time IFRS interim reporting, these effects and
transitional procedures (see IFRS 1) likely reduce the power of our tests.
With these caveats in mind, our study makes several contributions to the literature. This study is
the first to analyze the capital-market effects around the introduction of mandatory IFRS reporting for
a large and global sample of firms. The move to mandatory IFRS reporting around the world is one
of the most important policy issues in financial accounting. Hence
Pendapat tentang Jurnal IFRS
Menurut kelompok kami IFRS memberikan bukti awal pada pasar modal, IFRS wajib pelaporan di 26 negara di seluruh dunia. Menggunakan contoh pengobatan lebih dari 3.100
perusahaan yang diberi mandat untuk mengadopsi IFRS, kami menganalisis pengaruh likuiditas saham di pasar saham,biaya ekuitas, nilai modal dan perusahaan. D dalam jurnal IFRS ini menggunakan 4 proxy untuk likuiditas pasar, yaitu proporsi dari nol kembali, harga dampak dari perdagangan, total biaya perdagangan, dan tawaran bertanya menyebar. Empat metode untuk menghitung biaya tersirat dari ekuitas modal. Penerapan IFRS ini memiliki mandate untuk semua public perusahaan yang diperdagangkan di Negara diberikan dari tanggal tertentu. strategi empiris menggunakan menggunakan tiga set.
Pertama menggunakan data panel perusahaan tahun 2001-2005, patokan likuiditas, biaya modal dan efek penilaian sekitar pengenalan terhadap perubahan IFRS Negara lainnya yang belum mandat atau mengizinkan IFRS pelaporan. Kedua masih menggunakan data panel perusahaan apakah pasar modal diperkirakan dampak cross-sectional menuju variasi yang masuk akal sehubungan dengan kerangka kerja kelembagaan Negara. Sebagai kekuatan perubahan peraturan, banyak perusahaan untuk mengadopsi IFRS yang tidak akan melakukannya jika tidak, IFRS pelaporan wajib memiliki efek yang lebih kecil atau tidak berdampak di Negara-negara dengan lemah hukum dan penegakan rezim atau di mana perusahaan miskin insentif untuk melakukan pelaporan. Ketiga , bahwa perusahaan mulai menerapkan IFRS pada titik-titik berbeda dalam waktu tergantung pada akhir tahun fiscal dan sebagai akibatnya pola adopsi di Negara tertentu terutama eksogen setelah tanggal awal untuk adopsi IFRS diatur
inflasi
Inflasi
Dalam ilmu ekonomi inflasi adalah suatu proses meningkatnya harga-harga secara umum dan terus-menerus (kontinu) berkaitan dengan mekanisme pasar dapat disebabkan oleh berbagai faktor, antara lain, konsumsi masyarakat yang meningkat atau adanya ketidak lancaran distribusi barang Dengan kata lain, inflasi juga merupakan proses menurunnya nilai mata uang,secara kontinu. Inflasi adalah proses dari suatu peristiwa, bukan tinggi-rendahnya tingkat harga. Artinya, tingkat harga yang dianggap tinggi belum tentu menunjukan inflasi. Inflasi dianggap terjadi jika proses kenaikan harga berlangsung secara terus-menerus dan saling pengaruh-mempengaruhi. Istilah inflasi juga digunakan untuk mengartikan peningkatan persediaan uangyang kadangkala dilihat sebagai penyebab meningkatnya harga. Ada banyak cara untuk mengukur tingkat inflasi, dua yang paling sering digunakan adalah CPI dan GDP deflator
Inflasi dapat digolongkan menjadi empat golongan, yaitu inflasi ringan, sedang, berat, dan hiperinflasi. Inflasi ringan terjadi apabila kenaikan harga berada di bawah angka 10% setahun; inflasi sedang antara 10%—30% setahun; berat antara 30%—100% setahun; dan hiperinflasi atau inflasi tak terkendali terjadi apabila kenaikan harga berada di atas 100% setahun.
Penyebab
Inflasi dapat disebabkan oleh dua hal, yaitu tarikan permintaan atau desakan biaya produksi
Inflasi tarikan permintaan (demand pull inflation) terjadi akibat adanya permintaan total yang berlebihan sehingga terjadi perubahan pada tingkat harga. Bertambahnya permintaan terhadap barang dan jasa mengakibatkan bertambahnya permintaan terhadap faktor-faktor produksi. Meningkatnya permintaan terhadap faktor produksi itu kemudian menyebabkan harga faktor produksi meningkat. Jadi, inflasi ini terjadi karena suatu kenaikan dalam permintaan total sewaktu perekonomian yang bersangkutan dalam situasi full employment.
Inflasi desakan biaya (cost push inflation) terjadi akibat meningkatnya biaya produksi (input) sehingga mengakibatkan harga produk-produk (output) yang dihasilkan ikut naik. Meningkatnya biaya produksi dapat disebabkan 2 hal,yaitu
kenaikan harga,misalnya bahan baku dan kenaikan upah/gaji,misalnya kenaikan gaji PNS akan mengakibatkan usaha-usaha swasta menaikkan harga barang-barang.
dan Factor-faktor yang menyebabkan terjadinya inflasi adalah sebagai berikut:
a. Tingkat pengeluaran agregat yang melebihi kemampuan perusahaan untuk menghasilkan barang dan jasa
b. Tuntutan kenaikan upah dari pekerja.
c. Kenaikan harga barang impor
d. Penambahan penawaran uang dengan cara mencetak uang baru
e. Kekacauan politik dan ekonomi seperti yang pernah terjadi di Indonesia tahun 1998. akibatnya angka inflasi mencapai 70%.
Penggolongan
Berdasarkan asalnya, inflasi dapat digolongkan menjadi dua, yaitu inflasi yang berasal dari dalam negeri dan inflasi yang berasal dari luar negeri. Inflasi berasal dari dalam negeri misalnya terjadi akibat terjadinya defisit anggaran belanja yang dibiayai dengan cara mencetak uang baru dan gagalnya pasar yang berakibat harga bahan makanan menjadi mahal. Sementara itu, inflasi dari luar negeri adalah inflasi yang terjadi sebagai akibat naiknya harga barang impor. Hal ini bisa terjadi akibat biaya produksi barang di luar negeri tinggi atau adanya kenaikan tarif impor barang.
Inflasi juga dapat dibagi berdasarkan besarnya cakupan pengaruh terhadap harga. Jika kenaikan harga yang terjadi hanya berkaitan dengan satu atau dua barang tertentu, inflasi itu disebut inflasi tertutup (Closed Inflation). Namun, apabila kenaikan harga terjadi pada semua barang secara umum, maka inflasi itu disebut sebagai inflasi terbuka (Open Inflation). Sedangkan apabila serangan inflasi demikian hebatnya sehingga setiap saat harga-harga terus berubah dan meningkat sehingga orang tidak dapat menahan uang lebih lama disebabkan nilai uang terus merosot disebut inflasi yang tidak terkendali (Hiperinflasi).
Berdasarkan keparahannya inflasi juga dapat dibedakan :
1. Inflasi ringan (kurang dari 10% / tahun)
2. Inflasi sedang (antara 10% sampai 30% / tahun)
3. Inflasi berat (antara 30% sampai 100% / tahun)
4. Hiperinflasi (lebih dari 100% / tahun)
Mengukur inflasi
Inflasi diukur dengan menghitung perubahan tingkat persentase perubahan sebuah indeks harga. Indeks harga tersebut di antaranya:
• Indeks harga konsumen (IHK) atau consumer price index (CPI), adalah indeks yang mengukur harga rata-rata dari barang tertentu yang dibeli oleh konsumen.
• Indeks biaya hidup atau cost-of-living index (COLI).
• Indeks harga produsen adalah indeks yang mengukur harga rata-rata dari barang-barang yang dibutuhkan produsen untuk melakukan proses produksi. IHP sering digunakan untuk meramalkan tingkat IHK di masa depan karena perubahan harga bahan baku meningkatkan biaya produksi, yang kemudian akan meningkatkan harga barang-barang konsumsi.
• Indeks harga komoditas adalah indeks yang mengukur harga dari komoditas-komoditas tertentu.
• Indeks harga barang-barang modal
• Deflator PDB menunjukkan besarnya perubahan harga dari semua barang baru, barang produksi lokal, barang jadi, dan jasa.
Dampak
Inflasi memiliki dampak positif dan dampak negatif- tergantung parah atau tidaknya inflasi. Apabila inflasi itu ringan, justru mempunyai pengaruh yang positif dalam arti dapat mendorong perekonomian lebih baik, yaitu meningkatkan pendapatan nasional dan membuat orang bergairah untuk bekerja, menabung dan mengadakan investasi. Sebaliknya, dalam masa inflasi yang parah, yaitu pada saat terjadi inflasi tak terkendali (hiperinflasi), keadaan perekonomian menjadi kacau dan perekonomian dirasakan lesu. Orang menjadi tidak bersemangat kerja, menabung, atau mengadakan investasi dan produksi karena harga meningkat dengan cepat. Para penerima pendapatan tetap seperti pegawai negeri atau karyawan swasta serta kaum buruh juga akan kewalahan menanggung dan mengimbangi harga sehingga hidup mereka menjadi semakin merosot dan terpuruk dari waktu ke waktu.
Bagi masyarakat yang memiliki pendapatan tetap, inflasi sangat merugikan. Kita ambil contoh seorang pensiunan pegawai negeri tahun 1990. Pada tahun 1990, uang pensiunnya cukup untuk memenuhi kebutuhan hidupnya, namun di tahun 2003 -atau tiga belas tahun kemudian, daya beli uangnya mungkin hanya tinggal setengah. Artinya, uang pensiunnya tidak lagi cukup untuk memenuhi kebutuhan hidupnya. Sebaliknya, orang yang mengandalkan pendapatan berdasarkan keuntungan, seperti misalnya pengusaha, tidak dirugikan dengan adanya inflasi. Begitu juga halnya dengan pegawai yang bekerja di perusahaan dengan gaji mengikuti tingkat inflasi.
Inflasi juga menyebabkan orang enggan untuk menabung karena nilai mata uang semakin menurun. Memang, tabungan menghasilkan bunga, namun jika tingkat inflasi di atas bunga, nilai uang tetap saja menurun. Bila orang enggan menabung, dunia usaha dan investasi akan sulit berkembang. Karena, untuk berkembang dunia usaha membutuhkan dana dari bank yang diperoleh dari tabungan masyarakat.
Bagi orang yang meminjam uang kepada bank (debitur), inflasi menguntungkan, karena pada saat pembayaran utang kepada kreditur, nilai uang lebih rendah dibandingkan pada saat meminjam. Sebaliknya, kreditur atau pihak yang meminjamkan uang akan mengalami kerugian karena nilai uang pengembalian lebih rendah jika dibandingkan pada saat peminjaman.
Bagi produsen, inflasi dapat menguntungkan bila pendapatan yang diperoleh lebih tinggi daripada kenaikan biaya produksi. Bila hal ini terjadi, produsen akan terdorong untuk melipatgandakan produksinya (biasanya terjadi pada pengusaha besar). Namun, bila inflasi menyebabkan naiknya biaya produksi hingga pada akhirnya merugikan produsen, maka produsen enggan untuk meneruskan produksinya. Produsen bisa menghentikan produksinya untuk sementara waktu. Bahkan, bila tidak sanggup mengikuti laju inflasi, usaha produsen tersebut mungkin akan bangkrut (biasanya terjadi pada pengusaha kecil).
Secara umum, inflasi dapat mengakibatkan berkurangnya investasi di suatu negara, mendorong kenaikan suku bunga, mendorong penanaman modal yang bersifat spekulatif, kegagalan pelaksanaan pembangunan, ketidakstabilan ekonomi, defisit neraca pembayaran, dan merosotnya tingkat kehidupan dan kesejahteraan masyarakat.
Dalam ilmu ekonomi inflasi adalah suatu proses meningkatnya harga-harga secara umum dan terus-menerus (kontinu) berkaitan dengan mekanisme pasar dapat disebabkan oleh berbagai faktor, antara lain, konsumsi masyarakat yang meningkat atau adanya ketidak lancaran distribusi barang Dengan kata lain, inflasi juga merupakan proses menurunnya nilai mata uang,secara kontinu. Inflasi adalah proses dari suatu peristiwa, bukan tinggi-rendahnya tingkat harga. Artinya, tingkat harga yang dianggap tinggi belum tentu menunjukan inflasi. Inflasi dianggap terjadi jika proses kenaikan harga berlangsung secara terus-menerus dan saling pengaruh-mempengaruhi. Istilah inflasi juga digunakan untuk mengartikan peningkatan persediaan uangyang kadangkala dilihat sebagai penyebab meningkatnya harga. Ada banyak cara untuk mengukur tingkat inflasi, dua yang paling sering digunakan adalah CPI dan GDP deflator
Inflasi dapat digolongkan menjadi empat golongan, yaitu inflasi ringan, sedang, berat, dan hiperinflasi. Inflasi ringan terjadi apabila kenaikan harga berada di bawah angka 10% setahun; inflasi sedang antara 10%—30% setahun; berat antara 30%—100% setahun; dan hiperinflasi atau inflasi tak terkendali terjadi apabila kenaikan harga berada di atas 100% setahun.
Penyebab
Inflasi dapat disebabkan oleh dua hal, yaitu tarikan permintaan atau desakan biaya produksi
Inflasi tarikan permintaan (demand pull inflation) terjadi akibat adanya permintaan total yang berlebihan sehingga terjadi perubahan pada tingkat harga. Bertambahnya permintaan terhadap barang dan jasa mengakibatkan bertambahnya permintaan terhadap faktor-faktor produksi. Meningkatnya permintaan terhadap faktor produksi itu kemudian menyebabkan harga faktor produksi meningkat. Jadi, inflasi ini terjadi karena suatu kenaikan dalam permintaan total sewaktu perekonomian yang bersangkutan dalam situasi full employment.
Inflasi desakan biaya (cost push inflation) terjadi akibat meningkatnya biaya produksi (input) sehingga mengakibatkan harga produk-produk (output) yang dihasilkan ikut naik. Meningkatnya biaya produksi dapat disebabkan 2 hal,yaitu
kenaikan harga,misalnya bahan baku dan kenaikan upah/gaji,misalnya kenaikan gaji PNS akan mengakibatkan usaha-usaha swasta menaikkan harga barang-barang.
dan Factor-faktor yang menyebabkan terjadinya inflasi adalah sebagai berikut:
a. Tingkat pengeluaran agregat yang melebihi kemampuan perusahaan untuk menghasilkan barang dan jasa
b. Tuntutan kenaikan upah dari pekerja.
c. Kenaikan harga barang impor
d. Penambahan penawaran uang dengan cara mencetak uang baru
e. Kekacauan politik dan ekonomi seperti yang pernah terjadi di Indonesia tahun 1998. akibatnya angka inflasi mencapai 70%.
Penggolongan
Berdasarkan asalnya, inflasi dapat digolongkan menjadi dua, yaitu inflasi yang berasal dari dalam negeri dan inflasi yang berasal dari luar negeri. Inflasi berasal dari dalam negeri misalnya terjadi akibat terjadinya defisit anggaran belanja yang dibiayai dengan cara mencetak uang baru dan gagalnya pasar yang berakibat harga bahan makanan menjadi mahal. Sementara itu, inflasi dari luar negeri adalah inflasi yang terjadi sebagai akibat naiknya harga barang impor. Hal ini bisa terjadi akibat biaya produksi barang di luar negeri tinggi atau adanya kenaikan tarif impor barang.
Inflasi juga dapat dibagi berdasarkan besarnya cakupan pengaruh terhadap harga. Jika kenaikan harga yang terjadi hanya berkaitan dengan satu atau dua barang tertentu, inflasi itu disebut inflasi tertutup (Closed Inflation). Namun, apabila kenaikan harga terjadi pada semua barang secara umum, maka inflasi itu disebut sebagai inflasi terbuka (Open Inflation). Sedangkan apabila serangan inflasi demikian hebatnya sehingga setiap saat harga-harga terus berubah dan meningkat sehingga orang tidak dapat menahan uang lebih lama disebabkan nilai uang terus merosot disebut inflasi yang tidak terkendali (Hiperinflasi).
Berdasarkan keparahannya inflasi juga dapat dibedakan :
1. Inflasi ringan (kurang dari 10% / tahun)
2. Inflasi sedang (antara 10% sampai 30% / tahun)
3. Inflasi berat (antara 30% sampai 100% / tahun)
4. Hiperinflasi (lebih dari 100% / tahun)
Mengukur inflasi
Inflasi diukur dengan menghitung perubahan tingkat persentase perubahan sebuah indeks harga. Indeks harga tersebut di antaranya:
• Indeks harga konsumen (IHK) atau consumer price index (CPI), adalah indeks yang mengukur harga rata-rata dari barang tertentu yang dibeli oleh konsumen.
• Indeks biaya hidup atau cost-of-living index (COLI).
• Indeks harga produsen adalah indeks yang mengukur harga rata-rata dari barang-barang yang dibutuhkan produsen untuk melakukan proses produksi. IHP sering digunakan untuk meramalkan tingkat IHK di masa depan karena perubahan harga bahan baku meningkatkan biaya produksi, yang kemudian akan meningkatkan harga barang-barang konsumsi.
• Indeks harga komoditas adalah indeks yang mengukur harga dari komoditas-komoditas tertentu.
• Indeks harga barang-barang modal
• Deflator PDB menunjukkan besarnya perubahan harga dari semua barang baru, barang produksi lokal, barang jadi, dan jasa.
Dampak
Inflasi memiliki dampak positif dan dampak negatif- tergantung parah atau tidaknya inflasi. Apabila inflasi itu ringan, justru mempunyai pengaruh yang positif dalam arti dapat mendorong perekonomian lebih baik, yaitu meningkatkan pendapatan nasional dan membuat orang bergairah untuk bekerja, menabung dan mengadakan investasi. Sebaliknya, dalam masa inflasi yang parah, yaitu pada saat terjadi inflasi tak terkendali (hiperinflasi), keadaan perekonomian menjadi kacau dan perekonomian dirasakan lesu. Orang menjadi tidak bersemangat kerja, menabung, atau mengadakan investasi dan produksi karena harga meningkat dengan cepat. Para penerima pendapatan tetap seperti pegawai negeri atau karyawan swasta serta kaum buruh juga akan kewalahan menanggung dan mengimbangi harga sehingga hidup mereka menjadi semakin merosot dan terpuruk dari waktu ke waktu.
Bagi masyarakat yang memiliki pendapatan tetap, inflasi sangat merugikan. Kita ambil contoh seorang pensiunan pegawai negeri tahun 1990. Pada tahun 1990, uang pensiunnya cukup untuk memenuhi kebutuhan hidupnya, namun di tahun 2003 -atau tiga belas tahun kemudian, daya beli uangnya mungkin hanya tinggal setengah. Artinya, uang pensiunnya tidak lagi cukup untuk memenuhi kebutuhan hidupnya. Sebaliknya, orang yang mengandalkan pendapatan berdasarkan keuntungan, seperti misalnya pengusaha, tidak dirugikan dengan adanya inflasi. Begitu juga halnya dengan pegawai yang bekerja di perusahaan dengan gaji mengikuti tingkat inflasi.
Inflasi juga menyebabkan orang enggan untuk menabung karena nilai mata uang semakin menurun. Memang, tabungan menghasilkan bunga, namun jika tingkat inflasi di atas bunga, nilai uang tetap saja menurun. Bila orang enggan menabung, dunia usaha dan investasi akan sulit berkembang. Karena, untuk berkembang dunia usaha membutuhkan dana dari bank yang diperoleh dari tabungan masyarakat.
Bagi orang yang meminjam uang kepada bank (debitur), inflasi menguntungkan, karena pada saat pembayaran utang kepada kreditur, nilai uang lebih rendah dibandingkan pada saat meminjam. Sebaliknya, kreditur atau pihak yang meminjamkan uang akan mengalami kerugian karena nilai uang pengembalian lebih rendah jika dibandingkan pada saat peminjaman.
Bagi produsen, inflasi dapat menguntungkan bila pendapatan yang diperoleh lebih tinggi daripada kenaikan biaya produksi. Bila hal ini terjadi, produsen akan terdorong untuk melipatgandakan produksinya (biasanya terjadi pada pengusaha besar). Namun, bila inflasi menyebabkan naiknya biaya produksi hingga pada akhirnya merugikan produsen, maka produsen enggan untuk meneruskan produksinya. Produsen bisa menghentikan produksinya untuk sementara waktu. Bahkan, bila tidak sanggup mengikuti laju inflasi, usaha produsen tersebut mungkin akan bangkrut (biasanya terjadi pada pengusaha kecil).
Secara umum, inflasi dapat mengakibatkan berkurangnya investasi di suatu negara, mendorong kenaikan suku bunga, mendorong penanaman modal yang bersifat spekulatif, kegagalan pelaksanaan pembangunan, ketidakstabilan ekonomi, defisit neraca pembayaran, dan merosotnya tingkat kehidupan dan kesejahteraan masyarakat.
Sejarah singkat suka duka dalam perjalanan membuat PI
Rasanya Bikin PI
Nikmatnya kuliah,sekarang baru saya rasakan tepatnya setelah saya memasuki awal semester 6 ini. Di semester yang padat ini banyak sekali tugas kuliah yang menumpuk sampai-sampai saya sendiri mual di buatnya, apalagi ditambah dengan penelitian Ilmiah atau lebih dikenal dengan PI. Awal Maret lalu pertama kali saya bertemu dengan dosen pembimbing, saya sama sekali belum menyiapkan judul apa yang akan saya ambil untuk penelitian ilmiah. Alhasil pertemuan pertama dengan dosen pembimbing terbuang sia-sia, itu dikarenakan kurangnya persiapan yang matang.
Minggu kedua pertemuan dengan dosen pembimbing berjalan dengan baik,judul sudah saya siapkan bab satu pun sudah saya selesaikan. Tetapi dosen pembimbing saya berkata lain yang tidak sesuai dengan harapan saya, bab 1 saya banyak sekali yang direvisi. Menurut dosen pembimbing saya, penelitian yang saya buat kurang greget. Sempat hopeless c waktu dosen saya bilang seperti itu. Menurut saya judul yang saya ajukan sudah sangat berbobot untuk di jadikan penelitian, dengan mengerahkan semua perjuangan akhirnya dosen saya luluh juga dan saya akhirnya boleh meneruskan judul penelitian yang saya ajukan. Hari-hari di kampus selalu saya sempatkan untuk berkunjung ke perpustakaan, mencari referensi buku yang sesuai dengan judul yang saya ambil. Bab 2 sudah hampir selesai,tetapi sewaktu pertemuan ketiga dengan dosen pembimbing masih ada revisi juga agak pusing sih tapi semangat untuk cepat lulus kuliah merupakan motivasi saya sendiri agar menyelesaikan Penulisan ilmiah ini. Alhamdulilah…..PI saya sudah hampir bab 5…seneng banget. Semoga saja cepet di ACC.
Nikmatnya kuliah,sekarang baru saya rasakan tepatnya setelah saya memasuki awal semester 6 ini. Di semester yang padat ini banyak sekali tugas kuliah yang menumpuk sampai-sampai saya sendiri mual di buatnya, apalagi ditambah dengan penelitian Ilmiah atau lebih dikenal dengan PI. Awal Maret lalu pertama kali saya bertemu dengan dosen pembimbing, saya sama sekali belum menyiapkan judul apa yang akan saya ambil untuk penelitian ilmiah. Alhasil pertemuan pertama dengan dosen pembimbing terbuang sia-sia, itu dikarenakan kurangnya persiapan yang matang.
Minggu kedua pertemuan dengan dosen pembimbing berjalan dengan baik,judul sudah saya siapkan bab satu pun sudah saya selesaikan. Tetapi dosen pembimbing saya berkata lain yang tidak sesuai dengan harapan saya, bab 1 saya banyak sekali yang direvisi. Menurut dosen pembimbing saya, penelitian yang saya buat kurang greget. Sempat hopeless c waktu dosen saya bilang seperti itu. Menurut saya judul yang saya ajukan sudah sangat berbobot untuk di jadikan penelitian, dengan mengerahkan semua perjuangan akhirnya dosen saya luluh juga dan saya akhirnya boleh meneruskan judul penelitian yang saya ajukan. Hari-hari di kampus selalu saya sempatkan untuk berkunjung ke perpustakaan, mencari referensi buku yang sesuai dengan judul yang saya ambil. Bab 2 sudah hampir selesai,tetapi sewaktu pertemuan ketiga dengan dosen pembimbing masih ada revisi juga agak pusing sih tapi semangat untuk cepat lulus kuliah merupakan motivasi saya sendiri agar menyelesaikan Penulisan ilmiah ini. Alhamdulilah…..PI saya sudah hampir bab 5…seneng banget. Semoga saja cepet di ACC.
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